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AC composio-cli

Read from or act on external apps (email, calendar, chat, source control, tickets, CRM, storage) through the Composio CLI, even when the user does not name Composio. Prefer a dedicated skill, CLI, or MCP server already available for the app. Not for local files, shell, browser, or web search.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Composio v0.1.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 880 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Read from or act on external apps (email, calendar, chat, source control, tickets, CRM, storage) through the Composio CLI, even when the user does not name…

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructureSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/installation.md:32
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://composio.dev/install | sh
      vendor-host
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/output.md:23
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | JSON result | `Tool…ion` | `composio link <toolkit>`, then rerun the same command |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/output.md:27
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | Banner, HTTP 400 code `4305` | `Tool…ugs` | correct the `--toolkit` or `--toolkits` value |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/output.md:47
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "slug": "Tool…ion"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/troubleshooting.md:48
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      `Tool…ion`. Use the toolkit named in the message:
      quoted

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 880 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 293: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed Composio CLI integration with meaningful authorization guardrails, though users should review the remote installer and connected-account access before use.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 3 Sept 2026