CD dropmail
Manage disposable email addresses using GuerrillaMail. Use when a user wants to create a temporary/throwaway email address, check a disposable inbox for messages, or avoid sharing their real email with untrusted services. Triggers on the phrases "temp email", "disposable email", "temporary email", "throwaway email", or "create a burner email".
Manage disposable email addresses using GuerrillaMail.
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
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high Obfuscation
uni-bidi-overridescripts/dropmail.py:79Bidirectional override characters (Trojan Source) (5 occurrences)"␀", "␀", "␀", "␀", "␀", # LRE RLE PDF LRO RLO
Medium and low: 3
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medium Obfuscation
uni-bidi-isolatescripts/dropmail.py:80Bidirectional isolate characters (rarely legitimate outside RTL text) (4 occurrences)"␀", "␀", "␀", "␀", # LRI RLI FSI PDI
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medium Obfuscation
uni-bidi-overridescripts/test_clean.py:69Bidirectional override characters (Trojan Source) (7 occurrences) (test fixture / example file)for cp in ("␀", "␀", "␀", "␀", "␀"):fixture -
low Obfuscation
uni-bidi-isolatescripts/test_clean.py:73Bidirectional isolate characters (rarely legitimate outside RTL text) (4 occurrences) (test fixture / example file)for cp in ("␀", "␀", "␀", "␀"):fixture
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 32 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 25 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1305 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 345: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 9 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.