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Destructive Command Guard - High-performance Rust hook for Claude Code that blocks dangerous commands before execution. SIMD-accelerated, modular pack system, whitelist-first architecture. Essential safety layer for agent workflows.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ali v1.0.0 80 files body ≈ 3 593 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerKubernetesPostgreSQLMySQLSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
27/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 24

  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs benches/heredoc_perf.rs:40
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive)
    rm -rf /
  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs benches/heredoc_perf.rs:87
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive)
    rm -rf /
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs README.md:1586
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (documentation of a security skill)
    rm -rf --no-preserve-root /     # Additional flags
    security skill
Medium and low: 21
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped docs/packs/system.md:91
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    | `wipefs` | wipefs removes filesystem signatures. Use with extreme caution. | high |
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs docs/scan/dockerfile-extractor-v1-spec.md:203
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
    # rm -rf / is safe in a comment
    fixturesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell DGC_IMPROVEMENT_PLAN__GPT.md:762
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (negated — the text forbids it)
    - piped interpreters (`curl ... | bash`)
    negated
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/packs/remote.md:106
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    | `ssh-remote-sudo-rm` | SSH remote execution with sudo rm is high-risk. | high |
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/packs/system.md:179
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    | `chmod-777` | chmod 777 makes files world-writable. This is a security risk. | high |
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/packs/system.md:182
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `chmod-setuid` | Setting setuid bit (chmod u+s) is a security-sensitive operation. | high |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:23
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash -s -- --easy-mode
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:654
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash -s -- --easy-mode
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:671
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:677
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash -s -- --version v0.1.0
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:683
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | sudo bash -s -- --system
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:197
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:200
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash -s -- --easy-mode
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:203
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | sudo bash -s -- --system
    security skill

A further 7 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (dcg) differs from the folder (destructive-command-guard)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 31 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3593 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -427 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 232: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 57 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed local safety hook that installs persistent command-guard integrations, with no artifact-backed evidence of hidden exfiltration or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026