SKILLEMALL.ai

CB opencode

OpenCode AI - AI-driven code editor/IDE (CLI/TUI version of Cursor/Windsurf). Use when: (1) AI-assisted coding tasks, (2) Code refactoring with AI, (3) GitHub PR review/fixes, (4) Multi-file edits requiring context, (5) Running AI agents on codebases. NOT for: simple one-line edits (use edit tool), reading files (use read tool).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Wang Lei v1.2.2 MIT-0 8 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 604 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
50
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc INDEX.md:25
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INDEX.md:35
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp -r /Users/wl/.openclaw/workspace/skills/opencode /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INDEX.md:139
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp -r opencode /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:21
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp -r /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/opencode ~/opencode-skill-backup 2>/dev/null || true
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:24
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp -r /Users/wl/.openclaw/workspace/skills/opencode /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:30
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chown -R root:wheel /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/opencode
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:31
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chmod -R 755 /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/opencode
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:151
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chown -R root:wheel /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/opencode
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc README.md:22
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SUMMARY.md:65
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp -r /Users/wl/.openclaw/workspace/skills/opencode /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw/skills/

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1604 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 330: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent OpenCode helper skill whose risks are expected for an AI coding CLI, though users should be careful with privileged install, sharing, and credential features.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026