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NEAR Protocol CLI installation and setup guide. Use when: (1) User asks how to install NEAR CLI, (2) User needs help setting up near-cli-rs, (3) User wants to verify NEAR CLI installation, (4) User needs to install near-cli-rs, (5) user wants to use near cli to perform any action on the blockchain. AGENTS MUST ALWAYS get the absolute path of the 'near' binary before execution.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Cuong DC v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 1 505 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationGitHubInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
60
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:42
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc README.md:130
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:21
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:34
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc  # For bash
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:35
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc   # For zsh
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:172
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      If you have a seed phrase or key:
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:234
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf --connect-timeout 30 --max-time 300 https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:254
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: NEAR Protocol CLI installation and setup guide. Use when: (1) User… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (near-tools) differs from the folder (near-cli-tools)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1505 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 379: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (26 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This documentation-only skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks agents to help with high-impact NEAR blockchain actions and credential workflows without enough safety boundaries.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026