SKILLEMALL.ai

BD color-filer

智能文件夹颜色标注与命名规范技能。通过 emoji 色块对文件/文件夹进行颜色分类,配合序号补零排序规则,实现直观的视觉化文件管理。适用于个人知识库、项目分类、资源归档等场景。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: cyrilcao v2.0.1 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 1 439 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/organize_workspace.py:516
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    exec(open(config_file, encoding='utf-8').read(), globals())

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 83 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1439 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 88: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2105 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 35 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 83 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a file organizer with expected local file-changing behavior, but its optional config loading can execute arbitrary Python code without clearly warning users.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026