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GStable AI Payment Protocol - enables AI Agents to discover, negotiate, and execute cryptocurrency payments on behalf of users

ClawHub Agent Skills author: d5c5ceb0 v1.0.0 8 files body ≈ 2 124 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructureSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:24
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: A primary wallet private key would expose high-value funds to agent-driven signing and transaction execution. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:37
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Required: wallet private key used to sign EIP-712 messages and send transactions
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:233
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY` | ✅ | Wallet private key used to sign EIP-712 messages and execute transactions (`0x` prefix) |
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/config.py:53
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "Please set it to your wallet private key (0x... format)."
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:59
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    uv run scripts/gstable-ai-payment.py get_link lnk_…tua
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:62
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    uv run scripts/gstable-ai-payment.py get_link lnk_…pGh
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:68
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    uv run scripts/gstable-ai-payment.py create_session lnk_…tua 137 USDC
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:74
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    uv run scripts/gstable-ai-payment.py pay lnk_…tua 137 USDC us…@….com
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:132
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    uv run scripts/gstable-ai-payment.py pay lnk_…tua 137 USDC us…@….com
    placeholder

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2124 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -34 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 126: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed crypto payment skill, but it gives an agent broad live-wallet authority, including automatic on-chain payments and unlimited token approvals.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026