SKILLEMALL.ai

CB world2agent-manage

Install, list, and remove World2Agent sensors on this OpenClaw machine via the openclaw-sensor-bridge supervisor (out-of-process; signals POST to /hooks/agent). Trigger whenever the user wants to subscribe to / watch / be notified about an outside-world source (Hacker News, GitHub, X, market data, RSS, papers, etc.) or wants to manage their existing W2A sensors.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: daibor v0.1.3 MIT-0 15 files · 13 scripts body ≈ 3 902 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 73/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
69
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
73/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-launchd.sh:54
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap "gui/$(id -u)" "$PLIST" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/_lib.sh:49
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    printf '%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s.plist' "$HOME" "$LAUNCHD_LABEL"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-launchd.sh:9
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (code comment)
    # Exit:    0 ok / 1 not on macOS, binary missing, launchctl bootstrap failed
    comment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-launchd.sh:55
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed; documentation table row)
    || out_err "launchctl bootstrap $PLIST failed"
    code literaltable
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/start.sh:41
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup "$binary" --foreground >>"$log" 2>&1 </dev/null &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/start.sh:42
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    disown 2>/dev/null || true

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 73/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 8 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3902 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (12 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -31 of 13 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 364: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real World2Agent sensor-management skill, but it needs Review because it can make durable host changes, install npm packages, alter OpenClaw hook settings, run a background supervisor, and auto-route notifications.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026