SKILLEMALL.ai

BF coding-agent

Run Codex CLI, Claude Code, Kiro CLI, OpenCode, or Pi Coding Agent via background process for programmatic control.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Daniil Burykin v1.5.0 5 files body ≈ 4 836 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 37/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/guide.md

IntegrationSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
37/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/guide.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:44
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://cli.kiro.dev/install | bash
    vendor-host
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.zh-CN.md:44
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://cli.kiro.dev/install | bash
    vendor-host

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/guide.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 37/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/guide.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/guide.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (coding-agent) differs from the folder (openclaw-kirocli-coding-agent)
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4836 tokens
  • 100Steps. 52 steps
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 45 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 52 items
  • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears intended for autonomous coding, but it normalizes no-approval tool execution and remote code changes without enough scoping or warnings.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026