SKILLEMALL.ai

DC telegram-colored-choices-buttons

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Daniil Burykin v1.0.0 4 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 577 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/setup_openclaw_bot.sh:68
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    API_BASE = "https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:255
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.sh:24
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    API_URL="https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage"
    placeholder

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2577 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a coherent Telegram bot button-styling helper, with expected Telegram API use and no evidence of hidden or malicious behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026