SKILLEMALL.ai

AC coding-agent

Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), thread-bound ACP harness requests in chat (for example spawn/run Codex or Claude Code in a Discord thread; use sessions_spawn with runtime:"acp"), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Claude Code: use --print --permission-mode bypassPermissions (no PTY). Codex/Pi/OpenCode: pty:true required.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Daniel Sinewe v0.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 598 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureDiscordGitHubSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: coding-agent (ClawHub)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (coding-agent) differs from the folder (coding-agent-claude-print)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 25 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2598 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 648: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is for delegating coding work to other agents, but it repeatedly recommends running them with reduced or disabled safety controls, including workflows that can install dependencies, change code, commit, push, and signal the host system.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026