BB windows-package-manager-installer
install windows software and windows package manager environments. use when the user wants to install a windows application, explicitly wants to install or configure winget or chocolatey, wants a windows package management environment set up, or wants chatgpt to decide whether to use winget or chocolatey for installation. prefer package-manager-based installation, install missing package managers when needed, configure chocolatey with the tsinghua mirror, and report clear success or failure status.
As a process B 78/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securitySKILL.md:141Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
Medium and low: 1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-execpolicy-bypassSKILL.md:141Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassedSet-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 78/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 61 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Failures and branches. 13 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1852 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 503: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 18 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.