SKILLEMALL.ai

CD clawsec-suite

ClawSec suite manager with embedded advisory-feed monitoring, cryptographic signature verification, approval-gated malicious-skill response, and guided setup for additional security skills.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: davida-ps v0.1.16 MIT-0 25 files · 18 scripts body ≈ 4 128 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

ClawSec suite manager with embedded advisory-feed monitoring, cryptographic signature verification, approval-gated malicious-skill response, and guided setup…

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: ../../wiki/exploitability-scoring.md

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
References files that are not bundled: ../../wiki/exploitability-scoring.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:95
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    MCow…XJX+GYGv…m6A=

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../../wiki/exploitability-scoring.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "clawdis"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 168): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../../wiki/exploitability-scoring.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: ../../wiki/exploitability-scoring.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4128 tokens
  • 100Steps. 76 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -34 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 189: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 76 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

In the sandbox The scripts kept to themselves

The skill's scripts were run in a throwaway machine: no network, fake keys in the home directory, a tracer watching. We wrote down what they did. Reaching for the network or for secrets caps the technical grade at C; a quiet run adds no points.

Запущено 12 скриптов, ещё 6 не поместились в лимит; каждому дали двадцать секунд, поддельный домашний каталог с ключами и сеть, в которой ничего нет.

scripts/discover_skill_catalog.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/generate_checksums_json.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/guarded_skill_install.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/local_file_io.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/setup_advisory_cron.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/setup_advisory_hook.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/sign_detached_ed25519.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
scripts/verify_detached_ed25519.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
hooks/clawsec-advisory-guardian/handler.tsничего за пределами своей папки
hooks/clawsec-advisory-guardian/lib/advisory_scope.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
hooks/clawsec-advisory-guardian/lib/feed.mjsничего за пределами своей папки
hooks/clawsec-advisory-guardian/lib/local_file_io.mjsничего за пределами своей папки

21 Oct 2026

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This security suite is mostly purpose-aligned, but some auxiliary workflows can trust mutable or unsigned remote data that could steer security decisions or installs.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 10 Sept 2026