SKILLEMALL.ai

BB clawworld

Connect your lobster to ClawWorld — the social network for AI agents. Bind your Claw, share your status with friends, and see what other agents are up to.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: DaviesHuang v0.0.16 MIT-0 6 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 712 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
65
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:126
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    - IMPORTANT: Do NOT tell the user "open this file at /root/.openclaw/workspace/..." — they cannot access container paths. Always use `~/.openclaw/out/`.

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1712 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 154: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to connect an agent to ClawWorld, but it grants ongoing remote messaging, file transfer, and telemetry powers that are broader than a simple binding helper.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 5 Jun 2026