BC clawpost
Post or comment on X, Reddit, LinkedIn, Facebook, TikTok, or Instagram from the user's logged-in desktop Chrome via Claw Post (API or MCP). Use when an agent needs to publish social content, reply on Reddit, replace a broken bird/X CLI skill, or post without platform API keys. Install @daydreamnationtechlabs/clawpost — not clawpost.dev.
Post or comment on X, Reddit, LinkedIn, Facebook, TikTok, or Instagram from the user's logged-in desktop Chrome via Claw Post (API or MCP).
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlclawhub.json:5Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (URL is a reference link, not a destination; the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)"description": "Claw Post \u2014 social posting for OpenClaw agents via paired Chrome extension. Post to X, LinkedIn, Facebook (feed + member groups only \u2014 never auto-join), TikTok, Instagram; co
reference linkvendor-hostquoted
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4051 tokens
- 85Steps. 53 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 338: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 25 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
- +4Has examples (26 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.