SKILLEMALL.ai

BD web3-trader

DEX swap 交易技能。当用户提到 swap、兑换、卖出、买入、换成 USDT、交易 ETH、DEX 交易、代币兑换、token swap、sell ETH、buy USDT、交易代币、限价单、limit order、挂单、永续合约、perpetual、开多、开空、做多、做空、杠杆、leverage、止盈、止损、Hyperliquid、平仓、close position、查持仓、funding rate、资金费率、风控、risk control 等关键词时激活。v1 通过 Antalpha AI DEX 聚合器做即时 Swap;v2 新增 Hyperliquid CLOB 限价单、永续合约、Agent Wallet 零托管签名。v2.0.1 新增三级风控确认、余额预检、订单修改、下单失败容错。支持 MetaMask/OKX/Trust/TokenPocket 四大钱包。零托管,私钥不离开用户钱包。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: deanpeng-dotcom v2.0.5 MIT-0 31 files · 1 script body ≈ 5 595 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 42/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
81
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
42/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: web3-trader (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:3
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    # Usage: curl -fsSL install.sh | bash
    comment
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Review carefully before installing, start with test or very small balances, treat any agent key as a live trading credential, and avoid using a main wallet private key. <br>
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/service/web3-trader.config.ts:13
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:131
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "taker": "0x81…1Dd"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use src/service/smart-swap-page.service.ts:476
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    <button class="confirm-btn step-btn" id="approveBtn" onclick="doApprove()">⚡ APPROVE ${sellToken}</button>
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/service/smart-swap.service.ts:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const INCH_ROUTER = "0x11…a65";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/tools/web3-trader.tools.ts:631
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    router_contract: "0x11…a65",
    quoted

Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5595 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 42/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5595 tokens
  • 100Steps. 107 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -2104 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 406: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 59 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 107 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
  • +3All 6 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real crypto-trading skill, but it needs Review because it can enable automated trades and has inconsistent disclosure around custody, automatic wallet prompts, approvals, and exposed trading credentials.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 18 Jun 2026