BB web3-transfer
Unified multi-chain transfer skill for BTC, EVM, and Solana. Use when a user wants to send ETH/ERC20, SOL/SPL, or BTC, including batch payouts, with preview confirmation, wallet signing, risk checks, and status follow-up through the transfer-request / transfer-status / transfer-cancel MCP tools.
As a process B 79/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsREADME.md:113Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- Never ask the user for a private key or seed phrase
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:84Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target1. Never request or accept a private key, seed phrase, recovery phrase, or keystore file.
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:87High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)Send 0.1 ETH to 0x74…44e
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:225High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)帮我转 0.1 ETH 到 0x74…44e
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "requires"
Process rating: all ten parameters 79/100
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 129 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2349 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 296: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 37 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 129 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.