SKILLEMALL.ai

AC authority-bias

Activate when: someone says 'should we trust the expert on this?', 'they're a professor/CEO/MD so they must be right', 'I don't want to push back on them', 'we deferred to the board and it blew up', or is evaluating a charismatic founder, assessing due diligence on a high-credential deal, or building a team where senior voices dominate.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: deciqAI v1.0.6 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 1 882 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Activate when: someone says 'should we trust the expert on this?', 'they're a professor/CEO/MD so they must be right', 'I don't want to push back on them'…

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:57
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **S6 — Structural counter (if you are the authority):** Explicitly invite dissent ("give me 3 reasons against") · separate suggestions from directives · install red team / premortem.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:109
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - No red team / premortem / devil's advocate on a high-stakes call

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Missing closing "quote at line 2, column 353: …nce on a high-credential deal, or building a team where senior voices dominate. ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1882 tokens
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 338: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a text-only decision-coaching skill about authority bias, with no executable behavior or hidden data access.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Jul 2026