BC lygo-champion-lightfather
Lightfather operator stack (consent-gated). Persona-only: install lygo-champion-council with champion_id Lightfather.
Lightfather operator stack (consent-gated).
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeskill-card.md:20Accesses a browser credential / cookie storeRisk: Operator workflows described by the skill may affect local state, API spend, publishing, companion-skill installation, or failsafe behavior if executed without review. <br>
Medium and low: 1
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medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeskill-card.md:21Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (security demo / example)Mitigation: Keep the default advisor-only posture; before any operator action, review the target tool, set paths explicitly, back up local state, and approve one command at a time. <br>
demo
Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 38 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1683 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 117: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.