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DC lygo-smart-disk-agent

LYGO SMART DISK AGENT — lean 100% LYGO CLAW. Localhost portal with local operator token (not cloud password), P0–P5, host Ollama. No HTTP chat-memory export. Read references/SECURITY.md first.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: LYRA Agent - LYGO OS v1.1.0 MIT-0 35 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 228 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

LYGO SMART DISK AGENT — lean 100% LYGO CLAW.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
58
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs public/verify/self_check.py:37
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed)
    if g.validate("rm -rf / && disable safety").get("verdict") != "QUARANTINE":
    code literal
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs scripts/self_check.py:49
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed)
    if g.validate("rm -rf / && disable safety").get("verdict") != "QUARANTINE":
    code literal
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs public/tests/test_smart_disk.py:24
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    P0Gate().validate("please rm -rf / now").get("verdict"), "QUARANTINE"
    code literalfixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token public/docs/00_VISION_AND_THEORY.md:3
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Signature:** `Δ9Φ963-LYGO…-v1`
    detector

Files scanned: 35. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 228 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 192: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 4 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 4)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed local AI portal skill with proportionate localhost, token, browser, and local metadata behavior, though some older design docs still describe a no-auth model.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 19 Jul 2026