SKILLEMALL.ai

BF lygo-sovereign-kernel-seeder

Sovereign Kernel Seeder for LYGO lattice — Merkle-anchored eggs that self-verify on insert, sovereign-sealed, zero external surface. Agents plug modular kernels instantly across the stack. Pure on-lattice modularity; consent-gated; pairs with kernel-egg-planter.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: LYRA Agent - LYGO OS v1.0.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 2 140 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Sovereign Kernel Seeder for LYGO lattice — Merkle-anchored eggs that self-verify on insert, sovereign-sealed, zero external surface.

As a process F 40/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/*

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
40/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/*
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/SECURITY.md:3
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Signature:** `Delt…-v1`
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/seed_kernel.py:179
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "signature": "Delt…-v1",
    detector

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/*

Process rating: all ten parameters 40/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/*
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/*
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Steps. 32 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2140 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 262: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 3)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a local Python-based registry seeder that is disclosed, consent-gated, and aligned with its stated purpose, with some practical cautions about what files users choose to embed.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 26 Jul 2026