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FD investmenttracker-platform

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: IvyWooo vv1.0.2 48 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 645 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
37/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
61
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 19
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token final_skill.py:18
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    self.api_key = "it_l…Pes"
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token MCP_FIX_PLAN.md:101
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    auth_token="it_l…Pes"
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token MCP_FIX_PLAN.md:285
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    auth_token="it_l…Pes"
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token updated_mcp_client.py:16
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    self.api_key = "it_l…Pes"
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token working_skill.py:53
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    self.auth_token = "it_l…Pes"
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md:138
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H 'X-API-Key: it_l…Pes' \
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md:138
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H 'X-API-Key: it_l…Pes' \
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token detailed_report.py:14
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (placeholder value)
    AUTH_TOKEN = 'it_l…Pes'
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token examples/transactions.md:89
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "wallet_address": "0x74…FDB",
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal final_skill.py:18
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    self.api_key = "it_l…Pes"
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token get_positions.py:13
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (placeholder value)
    AUTH_TOKEN = 'it_l…Pes'
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token mcp_api_issue_analysis.md:36
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H 'X-API-Key: it_l…Pes'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal mcp_api_issue_analysis.md:36
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -H 'X-API-Key: it_l…Pes'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token mcp_api_test_commands.sh:10
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (test fixture / example file)
    API_KEY="it_l…Pes"
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal mcp_api_test_commands.sh:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    API_KEY="it_l…Pes"
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token test_mcp_protocol.py:113
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    auth_token="it_l…Pes"
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token test_mcp_sse.py:226
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    auth_token="it_l…Pes"
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token test_updated_api.py:151
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    auth_token="it_l…Pes"
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal updated_mcp_client.py:16
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    self.api_key = "it_l…Pes"

Files scanned: 48. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 76 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1645 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -230 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 76 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This investment-tracking skill is purpose-aligned, but it ships live-looking API keys and prints or stores credentials while accessing sensitive financial account data.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 27 May 2026