AC security-review
Attacker's-eye security review of a diff, branch, or module — walks a fixed vulnerability catalog (missing authz on new endpoints, injection, secrets in code/logs, trusting client-sent identity, SSRF, path traversal, insecure deserialization, mass assignment, broken crypto, unsafe redirects, dependency CVEs) where every finding must name a concrete attack path (attacker does X → gains Y) or be demoted to hardening advice. Never claims "secure", only "nothing found in the classes checked". Use this skill whenever the user says "security review", "is this secure", "check for vulnerabilities", "audit the auth", "threat model this", "pentest mindset", "check for injection", or "/security-review" — even if they don't name the skill. Distinct from code-review (security is one lens there); this is the dedicated deep pass.
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: Attacker's-eye security review of a diff, branch, or module — walks a fixed vulnerability catalog (missing authz on new endpoints, injection, secrets in code/logs, trusting client-sent id
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:30Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)3. **Evidence-gate every finding.** A finding must state, in one sentence, the attack path: *who* (unauthenticated user / any logged-in user / tenant B / insider) does *what* → gains *what*. No constr
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
- 100Steps. 29 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2180 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 826: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
- +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.