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CD yaxie-knowledge-base

亚协体育瑜伽馆经营知识库读取技能。当需要查询瑜伽馆经营相关知识时使用，包括：销售话术、活动策划、团队管理、股权合伙、抖音运营、私教成交、会员运营、卡项设计等亚协知识库内容。支持关键词搜索、文件内容读取、知识点总结。触发场景：(1)用户询问瑜伽馆经营问题 (2)需要调用亚协知识库内容回答 (3)查询馆主关心的经营痛点解决方案

ClawHub Agent Skills author: design84086505-maker v1.0.1 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 338 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/wiki_list.js:10
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/wiki_read.js:14
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/wiki_search.js:12
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token SKILL.md:58
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    - App Secret: CRSq…Xox
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/wiki_list.js:10
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/wiki_read.js:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/wiki_search.js:12
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const APP_SECRET = 'CRSq…Xox';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:58
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    - App Secret: CRSq…Xox

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (yaxie-knowledge-base) differs from the folder (yaxie-yoga-studio-consultant)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 338 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 162: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s purpose is coherent, but it packages reusable Feishu credentials and broad wiki access scripts that could expose a private business knowledge base.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026