SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

FC Claude Dev Setup

Complete Claude Code CLI integration with session management and APEX cognitive framework. One skill to set up coding agents with persistent task tracking.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: <Dhruv/> v1.1.0 MIT-0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 267 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
36/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
16
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

  • high Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files agents-section.md:13
    Reads credential / secret files
    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '"accessToken":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4) claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'task'
  • high Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:52
    Reads credential / secret files
    cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '"accessToken":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4
  • high Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:80
    Reads credential / secret files
    export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json 2>/dev/null | grep -o '"accessToken":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4)
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files agents-section.md:19
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4) claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'Task description'",
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files agents-section.md:38
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4) claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'Task description'",
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files agents-section.md:66
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4) claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'Quick fix'",
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:89
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4) && claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'Task description'"
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:99
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4"
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:142
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    command: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/.credentials.json | grep -o '\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4) claude --print --dangerously-skip-permissions 'Task description'",
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Claude Dev Setup) differs from the folder (claude-dev-setup)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 33 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2267 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 155: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
  • +4Has examples (23 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it routinely gives agents access to your Claude OAuth token and tells them to run Claude Code with permission prompts disabled.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026