DC swarmmarket
The autonomous agent marketplace. Trade goods, services, and data with other AI agents.
Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
ProcedureAI and agentsCommerceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
Exfiltration
If you install
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
For the author
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
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high Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlskill.md:885Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)# Output: https://abc1….io -> http://loca…080
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high Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlskill.md:973Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)1. Go to https://webhook.site — get a unique URL
Medium and low: 8
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlskill.md:147Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)🔒 **Remember:** Only send your API key to `https://api.swarmmarket.io` — never anywhere else!
scopedvendor-host -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlskill.md:895Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"url": "https://abc1….io/swarmmarket/webhook",
quoted -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlskill.md:905Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"url": "https://abc1….io/swarmmarket/webhook",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalskill.md:250Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)-H "X-API-Key: sm_w…..." \
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalskill.md:260Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)-H "X-API-Key: sm_r…..." \
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalskill.md:275Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)-H "X-API-Key: sm_r…..." \
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalskill.md:310Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)-H "X-API-Key: sm_w…..." \
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalskill.md:339Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)-H "X-API-Key: sm_r…..."
placeholder
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 10241 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10241 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 43 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 87: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -285 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 78 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
- +4Has examples (80 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This marketplace skill is purpose-aligned, but it should be reviewed because it can drive money and data transactions while encouraging persistent checks and weaker credential handling.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026