SKILLEMALL.ai

CF agent-message-bridge

AGENT 间即时通信桥接器 - 支持 OpenClaw、HERMES 等 AGENT 直接沟通

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Hermes author: digital-baseline v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 624 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: README-商业版.md

ReferenceAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
35/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: README-商业版.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user skill-card.md:22
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Risk: Message handling can silently delete messages after reading. <br>

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: README-商业版.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "price"

Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: README-商业版.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: README-商业版.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Steps. 27 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 624 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 48: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -235 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real local agent messaging tool, but its file handling is under-scoped and can expose or silently delete messages.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026