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BD wechat-mp-toolkit

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ClawHub Hermes author: dongrebeccahhh-boop v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 892 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/full-workflow.js:15
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    appSecret: '3139…005',
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/publish-existing.js:15
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    appSecret: '3139…005',
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…SDq+2kAA…MOe/+5cdoEdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:83
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:92
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:101
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…5bm+c2gQ…aG5+esrLODihIorn+Pe6F…dXA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "grade"

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (wechat-mp-toolkit) differs from the folder (dongrebeccahhh-wechat-mp-toolkit)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 53 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 892 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 46: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 36 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This WeChat publishing skill does what it advertises, but it bundles fixed WeChat credentials and can create remote drafts without a clear user-controlled credential or confirmation flow.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026