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DB ogp-expose

Expose OGP via a public HTTPS endpoint, usually a stable Cloudflare hostname or named tunnel. Use when the user wants to verify or fix gateway reachability, align `gatewayUrl` with the real public endpoint, or set up temporary cloudflared/ngrok exposure for testing.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: latentgenius v0.6.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 198 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationCloudflareInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
49
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:336
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.ogp.tunnel.plist
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:111
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv clou…d64 /usr/local/bin/cloudflared
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:112
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cloudflared
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:310
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Create `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.ogp.tunnel.plist`:
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:146
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. Display a public URL (e.g., `https://abc-…com`)
    demoquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:163
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. Display a public URL (e.g., `https://abc1…app`)
    demoquoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:360
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable ogp-tunnel

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "skill_name"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "trigger"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 62 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2198 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 266: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 62 items
  • +4Has examples (23 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 49.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a clear guide for intentionally exposing an OGP daemon through Cloudflare or ngrok, with the main public-access risks disclosed.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026