SKILLEMALL.ai

BC soul-archive

Soul Archive — A digital personality persistence system + agentic memory. Builds your digital soul clone through everyday AI conversations, with proactive context injection, cross-session recall, failure-pattern warning, and pattern distillation. All data stored locally as plaintext JSON. Six modes: Soul Extract, Soul Chat, Soul Report, Soul Context Inject, Agent Memory Recall, AI Self-Improvement. | 灵魂存档 ---- 通过日常 AI 对话构建数字人格克隆体 + 主动智能体记忆。支持自动 hook、对话开始时主动注入人格摘要、跨会话召回、失败模式预警、行为模式蒸馏。数据全部本地明文 JSON。六大模式:灵魂沉淀、灵魂对话、灵魂报告、上下文注入、智能体记忆召回、AI 自我改进。Trigger words: soul extract, soul archive, soul update, soul chat, soul report, soul context, soul recall, soul warn, self-reflect, self-improve, learn from mistakes, 灵魂沉淀, 灵魂提取, 灵魂存档, 灵魂报告, 灵魂对话, 自我反思, 自我批评, 自我学习.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: dqsjqian v3.2.0 MIT-0 16 files body ≈ 2 188 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorData and analyticsAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep Glob

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requirements"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2188 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -249 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -37 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 758: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs Review because it automatically builds and reuses a sensitive plaintext personality archive and can impersonate the user.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 18 Aug 2026