SKILLEMALL.ai

BB dreamapi-skill

25 AI-powered tools for video generation, talking avatars, image editing, voice cloning, and more — powered by DreamAPI. Describe what you want and the agent handles the rest.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: dreamfaceapp v1.0.0 MIT-0 32 files body ≈ 2 295 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentsWriting and documentsMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump references/user.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    references/user.md

Files scanned: 32. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2295 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 10 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 175: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (10 of 12)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real DreamAPI media tool, but it needs review because it uploads sensitive media to a third-party service and enables face, voice, and watermark manipulation without adequate consent or rights guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026