AD choco
Chocolatey operations integration — post-processing after choco upgrade, nssm service path refresh, NSSM → shawl migration (syncthing v2 etc.), resync on UniGetUI/choco metadata update failures. diagnose [diagnose.md], metadata-fix [metadata-fix.md], post-upgrade [post-upgrade.md], shawl-migration [shawl-migration.md], update-path [update-path.md]. Use when: "choco", "chocolatey", "choco upgrade", "choco outdated", "vcredist", "nssm", "nssm recovery", "nssm path", "service path refresh", "after choco upgrade", "service failure", "SERVICE_STOPPED", "shim issue", "syncthing nssm", "syncthing v2", "shawl migration", "nssm deprecation", "service-specific error", "UniGetUI", "metadata update failure", "metadata stale", ".nuspec stale", "choco metadata".
Chocolatey operations integration — post-processing after choco upgrade, nssm service path refresh, NSSM → shawl migration (syncthing v2 etc.), resync on…
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-execpolicy-bypassshawl-migration.md:112Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassedgsudo powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "C:\Users\<user>\migrate-<service>-to-…ps1"
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-execpolicy-bypassSKILL.md:87Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassedgsudo powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<script.ps1>"
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1274 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 21 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 758: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.