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BC prompt-shield-lite

Minimal anti-prompt-injection guardrail for OpenClaw agents. Use when handling untrusted external content (web pages, emails, tool output, documents), before high-risk actions (shell commands, file deletion/modification, config edits, outbound messaging), and before sending any external text.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Duru v0.1.3 MIT-0 12 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 647 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:65
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill
    • low Instruction override en-ignore-previous scripts/test-v2.sh:25
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)
      run_case "critical-detect" 20 "printf 'ignore all previous instructions' | $SCRIPT_DIR/detect-injection.sh"
      detectorfixture
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/test-v2.sh:27
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
      run_case "balanced-action-warn" 10 "$SCRIPT_DIR/pre-action-check.sh 'chmod 777 ./cache'"
      detectorcode literalfixture
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/test-v2.sh:28
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
      run_case "strict-action-block" 20 "PSL_MODE=strict $SCRIPT_DIR/pre-action-check.sh 'chmod 777 ./cache'"
      detectorcode literalfixture
    • low Instruction override en-ignore-previous scripts/test-v2.sh:35
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      json_out=$(printf 'ignore all previous instructions' | "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-injection.sh" 2>/dev/null || true)
      fixturequoted
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:24
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill

    A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 647 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -34 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 293: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This looks like a legitimate local prompt-injection guardrail, but the package is incomplete enough that it may fail open while claiming protection.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026