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AC google-voice

Google Voice web-client automation and MCP integration from HAR captures. Use when reverse-engineering voice.google.com.har or call_voice.google.com.har, listing/reading/exporting received Google Voice SMS threads/records from messages URLs or itemId values, sending Google Voice text messages with explicit approval, starting outbound Google Voice calls with explicit approval, injecting approved TTS/local audio into calls, recording call audio, or configuring/using the bundled Google Voice HAR MCP server in OpenClaw.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Earl Co v0.3.0 MIT-0 10 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 537 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/google-voice-call-audio-engine.js:11
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      const browser = await puppeteer.launch({ executablePath, args: ['--no-sandbox','--disable-setuid-sandbox','--use-fake-ui-for-media-stream','--use-fake-device-for-media-stream',`--use-file-for-fake-aud
      detectorcode literal
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/google-voice-mcp.js:26
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      function endpoint(path) { return `https://clie…com${path}?alt=…&key=… }
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/google-voice-sms-records.js:16
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      function endpoint(path){return `https://clie…com${path}?alt=…&key=…
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1537 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -31 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 521: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is for Google Voice automation, but it gives an agent broad access to private messages, texting, calling, recording, and raw authenticated API calls.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026