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FD sui-agent-wallet

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Eason Chen v1.0.3 20 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 642 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
16/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
26
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 26

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 26
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/index.ts:344
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    // Get seed phrase (DANGEROUS - only for backup)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/index.ts:352
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    // Import from seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/keychain.ts:2
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * macOS Keychain integration for secure seed phrase storage
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/keychain.ts:11
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Store seed phrase in macOS Keychain
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/keychain.ts:34
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Retrieve seed phrase from macOS Keychain
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/keychain.ts:49
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Delete seed phrase from Keychain
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/wallet.ts:4
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * Seed phrase is stored securely in macOS Keychain.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:14
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    (Wallet Standard)            (Seed Phrase)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:37
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    The server automatically generates a 12-word seed phrase and stores it in **macOS Keychain**:
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:44
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Seed phrase stored securely in macOS Keychain.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:46
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    To view your seed phrase for backup:
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:59
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | macOS Keychain | Seed phrase (encrypted) |
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/install.sh:38
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo -n "iVBO…ggg==" | base64 -d > "$ICONS_DIR/icon16.png"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/index.ts:342
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    // === Seed Phrase Management ===
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/index.ts:506
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(`   GET  /mnemonic       - Get seed phrase (backup)`);
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/index.ts:507
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(`   POST /import         - Import from seed phrase`);
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/keychain.ts:25
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('✅ Seed phrase stored in macOS Keychain');
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/wallet.ts:73
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('🔐 Loaded seed phrase from macOS Keychain');
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/wallet.ts:87
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('  Seed phrase stored securely in macOS Keychain.');
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/wallet.ts:89
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('  To view your seed phrase for backup:');
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets server/wallet.ts:101
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('⚠️  Failed to store in Keychain. SAVE THIS SEED PHRASE:');
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-dapp/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml:143
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…SzS+cfgl…B0A==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-dapp/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml:147
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…Om3+5ZRS…Lw6+EGyk…kl3+UP9+sdz7…Y3g==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-dapp/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml:150
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…ToE+vYgD…UJ8+N1Am3Mz4+xOBy…f4D+CpkA==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-dapp/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml:222
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…mp4+hpaf…WbT//d20x…uaA/eGVw==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-dapp/frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml:270
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…HlP+kuwq…IXN/mDJIfGXvcMqCgYKekoQw==}

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 27 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1642 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real Sui agent wallet, but it exposes seed phrases and signing controls through unauthenticated localhost APIs that websites or local processes could abuse.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026