CB bilibili-video-search-and-download
Search and download Bilibili videos using yt-dlp and httpx. Use this skill whenever the user wants to search Bilibili for videos by keyword, retrieve video metadata (title, author, play count, duration, BV号), download Bilibili videos, or save search results to a JSON file. Also triggers when the user mentions "bilibili search", "bilibili download", "B站搜索", "b站视频搜索", "b站下载", or wants to find/download Bilibili content programmatically via Python.
Search and download Bilibili videos using yt-dlp and httpx.
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeskill-card.md:22Accesses a browser credential / cookie storeRisk: Authenticated downloads may use browser cookies from Chrome. <br>
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:233Accesses a browser credential / cookie store/tmp/bilibili_venv/bin/yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome \
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 13 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2789 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 448: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 26 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (22 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.