SKILLEMALL.ai

FC proxmox-wazuh-enroll

Install and enroll the Wazuh agent inside Windows VMs hosted on Proxmox VE using QEMU guest agent execution (qm guest exec or Proxmox REST API), with no WinRM, SSH, RDP, GPO, or AD credentials required. Use this skill whenever the user asks to get a Windows Proxmox guest, domain controller, file server, or group of Windows VMs reporting to Wazuh; install, push, roll out, onboard, or enroll the Wazuh agent; fix a just-enrolled Windows Proxmox VM stuck at never_connected; or keep registration secrets off command lines while deploying via guest agent. This skill performs active in-guest deployment and verification against the Wazuh manager. Do not use for read-only Wazuh dashboard, CVE, alert, or coverage checks; Linux, LXC, appliance, or syslog enrollment; generic Proxmox VM creation; generic PowerShell guest exec; or non-Wazuh endpoint agents.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Eddy v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 690 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Install and enroll the Wazuh agent inside Windows VMs hosted on Proxmox VE using QEMU guest agent execution (qm guest exec or Proxmox REST API), with no…

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-encoded-exec references/qga-exec.md:22
    Executes a base64/encoded payload (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "\$d=[Text.Encoding]::UT…ing([Convert]::Fr…ing('$b64')); Invoke-Expression \$d" 2>&1
    quoted
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/qga-exec.md:30
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    PID=$(curl -sk -H "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=$TOKENID=$SECRET" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/qga-exec.md:35
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -sk -H "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=$TOKENID=$SECRET" \

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 690 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 854: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a legitimate Wazuh enrollment helper, but users should review it because one install example can expose the Wazuh registration password while running privileged VM commands.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 29 Jun 2026