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BF 0x0-messenger

Send and receive P2P messages using disposable PINs. No servers, no accounts. For agent-to-agent messaging, approval flows, and notifications.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tiida Tech v1.1.1 MIT-0 48 files body ≈ 385 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 28/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
28/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets bin/0x0.js:164
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('show 12-word seed phrase for your number')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets bin/0x0.js:169
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('restore number from 12-word seed phrase')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets bin/c0x0.js:164
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('show 12-word seed phrase for your number')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets bin/c0x0.js:169
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    .description('restore number from 12-word seed phrase')
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:35
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:52
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:120
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:154
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:443
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/commands/backup.js:9
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(chalk.gray('// backup seed phrase'))
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/commands/backup.js:23
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log(chalk.gray('// invalid seed phrase'))
    quoted

Files scanned: 47. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 28/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 385 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 142: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real messenger, but it needs Review because it stores sensitive chat/PIN data locally and includes under-disclosed server and web-control behavior.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026