SKILLEMALL.ai

AC filechat

Search, retrieve, and chat with documents securely stored in a designated Google Drive folder using semantic vector search (RAG RAG). Use when: (1) a user asks to save a file for later, (2) a user asks a question about their saved files/documents, (3) a user asks you to retrieve or send them a previously stored file, (4) a user asks to sync or flush their document library. This skill automatically chunks, embeds, and indexes Google Drive documents into a local persistent ChromaDB instance.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: eladrave v1.0.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 721 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ReferenceGoogle DriveAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url query.js:33
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      const url = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sync.js:42
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      const url = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/text…ent?key=…
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sync.js:55
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      const url2 = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (filechat) differs from the folder (filechat-old-ugnire)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
    • 100Steps. 4 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 721 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 494: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This document-chat skill appears useful but needs review because it can recursively copy private Drive files, persist searchable indexes, and send document content and queries to Gemini without clear consent controls.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026