BC filechat-rag
Search, retrieve, and chat with documents securely stored in ANY Google Drive folder using semantic vector search (RAG). Use when: (1) a user asks to save a file for later, (2) a user asks a question about their saved files/documents, (3) a user asks you to retrieve or send them a previously stored file, (4) a user asks to sync or flush their document library. This skill automatically chunks, embeds, and indexes Google Drive documents into isolated persistent vector databases per folder, uses incremental caching to speed up syncs, supports multiple folders via a local registry, resolves shortcuts, OCRs images natively, and supports Qdrant Cloud or local JSON backups.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
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high Secrets in code
meta-credential-filestests/credentials.jsonCredential / dotenv files bundled with the skill (1)tests/credentials.json
Medium and low: 10
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfolders.json:4High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"id": "1mIC…RrO",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:84High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:128High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:305High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:321High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:334High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
detector -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlquery.js:64Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)const url1 = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlquery.js:79Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)const url2 = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlsync.js:88Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)const url1 = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlsync.js:103Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)const url2 = `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemi…ent?key=…
placeholder
Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Failures and branches. 13 branches
- 100Steps. 17 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1326 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 675: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
- +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.