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AC seer-cli

CLI for the Seer media request management API. Search movies and TV shows, create and manage media requests, manage users, track issues, and administer a self-hosted Seer instance. Use when asked to find, request, or manage media content, check what is trending, look up actors or collections, manage users, or check system status.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Omid Astaraki vv0.4.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 462 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:38
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv seer-cli /usr/local/bin/

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (seer-cli) differs from the folder (seer-manager)
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 4 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3462 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 331: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 33 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (30 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill appears to document legitimate administrative API operations, but it includes high-impact delete and user-management actions without enough guardrails.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026