BC agent-hush
Invisible privacy guardian for agent workspaces. Automatically intercepts outbound actions (git push, skill publish, file sharing) and checks for sensitive data leaks. Users don't need to know commands — the agent handles everything silently. Activate on: ANY outbound action (push, publish, share, sync, send files), or when user asks "检查隐私", "有没有敏感信息", "privacy check", "scan for secrets".
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyREADME_EN.md:130Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)- Private key blocks (`-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyREADME.md:128Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)- 私钥文件块（`-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlyquoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/sanitize.py:116High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)r'''bedr…29t''',
detector
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
- 100Steps. 20 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1433 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 391: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.