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ClawHub Agent Skills author: enigma-zeroclaw v1.0.1 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 1 890 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationStripeAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-12-sql-injection-patch.md:24
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Privilege escalation (bypassing authentication)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-12-sql-injection-patch.md:25
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Ransomware-style data encryption
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-13-zero-trust-outbound-security.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Connect to ransomware infrastructure
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-13-zero-trust-outbound-security.md:32
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Perform lateral movement to other cloud resources
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-13-zero-trust-outbound-security.md:76
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Database lateral movement (ports 3306, 5432, 6379)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-14-zero-trust-security-verification.md:125
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    2. **Bug bounty program** — Incentivize responsible vulnerability disclosure
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security blog/2026-03-17-security-metrics-service-real-time-threat-detection.md:45
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Brute Force Attacks:** 10+ failed authentication attempts from the same IP in one hour. This is classic credential stuffing or password spraying.

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "url"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "icon"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "skill_md"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mcp"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "graphql"

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1890 tokens
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 141: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The exchange integration is disclosed, but the package also contains unrelated website maintenance, deployment, and payment setup material that could lead to unintended live changes if followed by an agent.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026