SKILLEMALL.ai

DD meili-memory

Local full-text search for OpenClaw memory recall using MeiliSearch. Self-hosted.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Eric Kariuki v3.0.0 MIT-0 8 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 826 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Local full-text search for OpenClaw memory recall using MeiliSearch.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructurePersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
60
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:66
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "meili-memory"; echo "0 * * * * cd ${SKILL_DIR} && bash scripts/indexer.sh >> /tmp/meili-indexer.log 2>&1") | crontab -
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:9
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -L https://install.meilisearch.com | sh
    vendor-host
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege install.sh:10
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ./meilisearch /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege install.sh:39
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp /tmp/meilisearch.service /etc/systemd/system/meilisearch.service
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/indexer.sh:356
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    STATS=$(curl -s "${MEILI_HOST}/indexes/${TIER}/stats" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${MEILI_KEY}" 2>/dev/null)
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install.sh:41
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable meilisearch
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention install.sh:66
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "meili-memory"; echo "0 * * * * cd ${SKILL_DIR} && bash scripts/indexer.sh >> /tmp/meili-indexer.log 2>&1") | crontab -

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 19 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 826 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 81: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears purpose-built for local memory search, but it installs persistent system services and cron jobs and indexes private memory automatically with weak user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 13 Jun 2026