SKILLEMALL.ai

DC openclaw-ops-skills

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Eric JIE v1.0.0 MIT-0 22 files body ≈ 767 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege skills/security-hardening.md:166
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (negated — the text forbids it)
    - "chmod 777"
    negated
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell skills/security-hardening.md:167
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (negated — the text forbids it)
    - "curl | bash"
    negated
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell skills/security-hardening.md:168
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (negated — the text forbids it)
    - "wget | sh"
    negated
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skills/security-hardening.md:232
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - "Reverse shell patterns"
    quoted

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 29 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 767 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill pack is transparent about enabling autonomous OpenClaw operations, but it sets up recurring unattended work and broad persistent memory/logging without strong default safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026