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BC huawei-cloud-ecs-sqlbot-deploy

Purchase Huawei Cloud X Instance server + one-click deploy SQLBot intelligent query application. Tech stack: Python 3.8+, Huawei Cloud SDK, COC (Cloud Operations Center) deployment. Key capabilities: AK/SK auth, X instance creation, auto security group config, SQLBot auto deployment. Use cases: Users who need to quickly deploy SQLBot intelligent query application on Huawei Cloud X instance servers. Trigger words: "deploy sqlbot", "install sqlbot", "sqlbot deploy", "one-click deploy sqlbot", "x-instance deploy sqlbot", "部署sqlbot", "安装sqlbot", "sqlbot部署", "一键部署sqlbot", "x实例部署sqlbot".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: huaweiclouddev-dev v1.0.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 4 063 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/cli-installation-guide.md:112
      Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation of a security skill)
      pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple huaweicloudsdkcore
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:18
      Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation of a security skill)
      command: pip install -i https://repo.huaweicloud.com/repository/pypi/simple huaweicloudsdkcore huaweicloudsdkecs huaweicloudsdkcoc requests
      security skill
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/deploy_sqlbot.py:505
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      print(f"   Password: SQLBot@123456")
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/deploy_sqlbot.py:524
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      f"  Password: SQLBot@123456\n\n"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:263
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      - SQLBot Password: SQLBot@123456

    Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 27 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4063 tokens
    • 85Steps. 55 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -243 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -35 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 588: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 31 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill broadly matches its SQLBot-on-Huawei-Cloud purpose, but it uses risky defaults that can expose passwords, run unverified remote code, and create billable cloud resources before clear user control.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 3 Aug 2026