BB huawei-cloud-evs-list
Query the list of Huawei Cloud EVS (Elastic Volume Service) disks under the current tenant / project, focused on the EVS disk NAME list. Returns each disk's name, id, status and size; can also output a pure EVS name-only list. Supports filtering by status, name and pagination (limit/offset). Uses the KooCLI command `hcloud EVS ListVolumes --cli-region={region}` (primary) against the v2 API, or the huaweicloudsdkevs Python SDK (fallback). Read-only — never creates, modifies or deletes any disk. Use this skill whenever the user wants to list/inspect the EVS disks of the tenant or query the EVS disk name list, e.g. for disk inventory, daily inspection, or cost review. Triggers include: "list EVS", "EVS list", "query EVS names", "EVS name list", "云硬盘列表", "查询云硬盘", "EVS磁盘名称", "云硬盘名称", "list volumes", "list elastic volumes", "how many EVS disks".
Query the list of Huawei Cloud EVS (Elastic Volume Service) disks under the current tenant / project, focused on the EVS disk NAME list.
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:12Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:18Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 23 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1627 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 851: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.