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FC twitter-dance

(no description)

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Evan v1.0.0 MIT-0 52 files body ≈ 2 105 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
0/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key QUICK_START.md:28
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export KIMI_API_KEY="sk-J…YW9"
    quoted
  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key README.md:39
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export KIMI_API_KEY="sk-J…YW9"
    quoted
  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key USAGE_GUIDE.md:208
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export KIMI_API_KEY="sk-J…YW9"
    quoted
Medium and low: 4
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv COMPLETION_SUMMARY.md:156
    Reads a .env file
    cat /Users/chao/.openclaw/workspace/skills/twitter-dance/.env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv UPGRADE_v2.0.md:82
    Reads a .env file
    cat .env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv USAGE_GUIDE.md:201
    Reads a .env file
    cp /Users/chao/.openclaw/workspace/skills/twitter-dance/.env .env.local
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token USAGE_GUIDE.md:207
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export TWITTER_AUTH_TOKEN="AAAA…uTs%3D1Z…TnA"
    quoted

Files scanned: 40. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2105 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -232 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -37 of 12 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 53 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (33 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it gives scripts broad live control over an X/Twitter account and includes unsafe credential examples and secret-printing behavior, so it needs manual review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026