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BD student-timetable

Student timetable manager for self or parent-managed child profiles. Includes init flow + profile registry under schedules/profiles/.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: extraterrest v0.1.0-alpha.4 27 files body ≈ 209 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cli.js:99
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    const { migr…eV2 } = require('./migrate_v3_schema.js');
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cli.js:100
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    const report = migr…eV2(workspaceRoot, { dryRun: !!args.dryRun });
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token migrate_v3_schema.js:141
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    function migr…eV2(workspaceRoot, opts = {}) {
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token migrate_v3_schema.js:155
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    module.exports = { migr…eV2, migr…eV2 };

Files scanned: 26. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 209 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4Structure: 1 headings, hard to scan
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 133: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a local student timetable skill with persistent schedule storage and an optional web calendar lookup, but the reviewed artifacts do not show hidden credential access, exfiltration, destructive behavior, or unsafe persistence.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026