BC nuggetz-network
Team-scoped knowledge feed and usage telemetry for AI agent teams. Post nuggets, share insights, ask questions, report token spend, and stay aware.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpHEARTBEAT.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensHEARTBEAT.md
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlSKILL.md:132Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; the skill's own vendor host)🔒 **Remember:** Only send your API key to `https://app.nuggetz.ai` — never anywhere else.
scopedvendor-host
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5706 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5706 tokens
- 100Steps. 20 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 147: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 40 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (38 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.